EUROPEAN HOBBES SOCIETY ONLINE COLLOQUIUM: SOVEREIGNTY AS A VOCATION IN HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (Response)

This online colloquium is dedicated to discussing Matthew Hoye’s book, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan. The discussion will commence with three critical commentaries, presented by Diego Rossello, Andrés Rosler and Meghan Robison. The author will then respond to his critics. We extend our gratitude to Amsterdam University Press for their support of this colloquium.

Matthew Hoye

Leiden University

Many thanks to the contributors for their thoughtful, critical, and constructive comments. I begin with a précis, then respond to the comments.

A Précis of Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan

The book consists of seven chapters, including an introduction.[1] Chapter Two studies the development of Hobbes’s political thought in the context of the English Civil Wars, focusing on urban republicanism. I argue that many of Leviathan’s political theoretical developments respond to the particular threat of urban republicanism. Specifically, I argue that the signature developments in Hobbes’s political theory in Leviathan can be profitably triangulated against (i) the general European idea that cities and boroughs are the communal wellsprings of republican ideas and practices, (ii) particular considerations regarding the role of borough corporations and the civil wars; and (iii) Hobbes’s discussions of democracy, specifically what I argue are particularly communal and naturalistic sources of democracy in Elements, which are the foundation of all other regimes. Doing so reveals how new additions to Hobbes’s political theory in Leviathan—the theory of the state, representation, and others—function to undermining not just republican ideology broadly understood (as has been long understood), but also, or specifically, the borough democratic and oligarchic republican practices that gave life to those ideas. The chapter concludes with a puzzle: Hobbes may have solved the problem of borough democratic and oligarchic republicanism, but he is (seemingly) left without an account of new foundations. That is, whereas democracy in Elements served pivotal historical, epistemic, and institutional functions in the politics of founding new regimes, democracy in Leviathan is stripped of these functions; there, democracy is merely a regime type, not an essential step in creating all regimes. It follows that either Hobbes abandoned all discussion of the real politics of new foundations—something quite different from theories of the social covenant—as seems to be assumed in much of the literature, or he did not, and the standard model of Hobbes’s thought in Leviathan has somehow failed to take note. I focus on the latter and the rest of the book explicates the politics of new foundations in Leviathan and some general implications for how we think about law and obligation in Hobbes.

Chapters Three through Five address constitutive rhetorical action and the politics of new foundations in Leviathan. Chapter Three explicates the idea of rhetorical action. Rhetorical action has been largely passed over in Hobbes scholarship on rhetoric, which has been laser-focused on textual rhetorical techniques, not enacted rhetorical practices. I trace the practice and the theory of rhetorical action from its first emergence in the poets, founders, and orators of antiquity through its reconceptualization and domestication in the works of the Greek philosophers and the Roman rhetoricians. Finally, I trace the modern re-emergence of the concept in the theatrical and poetic rhetoric of the early modern period. I show how the idea of rhetorical action—most especially in its relationship to new foundations—was considered a singularly powerful tool by which leaders of exceptional virtue or magnanimity could command the obedience and allegiance of the many not by engaging in dialogue but by the fact of their eminent virtue. The orator-founder does not persuade; their very eminence transforms their audience, transfixing each member to a higher ethical-political order beyond pure self-interest, diffidence, and acrimony. Did Hobbes take notice? Chapter Four situates Hobbes and Leviathan within the history of rhetorical action, arguing that there are many reasons to believe Hobbes was not just aware of this line of rhetorical practice and theory but deeply engaged with it.

Chapter Five explicates Hobbes’s theory of new foundations in Leviathan. Against the aforementioned assumption that Hobbes does not set out a theory of new foundations, I show that Hobbes does and that it is set out (initially) in xii built upon the core character traits of wisdom, sincerity, love, and divine revelation in the foundation of a new regime. That, of course, is puzzling: wisdom, sincerity, love, and divine revelation are not what we have come to expect from Hobbes’s sovereigns! Indeed, xii is not just surprising, it seems almost impossible as it disagrees with axioms of Hobbes interpretation. I address three: natural/political equality (xii indicating that there are politically and socially crucial inequalities of persons), that justice cannot exist before the sovereign (xii indicating that there is something like natural justice), and that there is no real distinction between regimes by institution and conquest, both resting on a pervasive fear (xii attesting to just the opposite: that there is a fundamental distinction and that Hobbes holds tight to it). On each count, I argue that on more or less basic textual grounds, the axioms do not hold, and indeed, they fail in ways that support the theory of foundations found in xii.

Chapter Six begins with a particular observation that, on its face, seems to yet again disagree with the standard account of law in Hobbes: why is it that in the concluding passages of Part II of Leviathan,Hobbes declares that his goal throughout was to teach sovereigns “natural justice”? Not natural law, not that all laws are outputs of sovereign command, certainly not to brandish the sword of sovereignty to bolster the law, but that the natural person who bears the office of the sovereign must be a philosopher of natural justice. To my knowledge, only Leon Harold Craig has taken this statement seriously. I argue that this is not an esoteric claim, wayward remark, or slip of the pen. Hobbes concludes on that point because it was the point and, more specifically, an integral element of his overarching theory of law. Beginning with a critique of natural justice and magnanimity in Aristotle and Hobbes’s De Cive—and then turning to Leviathan through analyses of the relationship between natural justice and nomos, natural law, the command theory of law, and the law of God—I argue that Hobbes’s account of law routinely references the necessity for instantiated and eminent sovereign virtue. I argue that natural and positive laws are conditioned by eminent sovereign virtue and that although that condition may be latent during normal times, it is essential for the practical realization of both in moments of emergency and crisis. Notably, this analysis has the benefits of, among other things, agreeing with xii and making sense of Hobbes’s discussions of the fool, which no longer seems unfinished or tagential, but essential.

Chapter Seven considers obligation and if sovereign vice explains regime collapse. From the perspective of Hobbes’s discussion of the subject’s obedience, the sovereign can do no wrong (except at the limit of the subjects right to life). I do not challenge that claim. But, taken from the perspective of Hobbes’s discussion of that sovereign’s character, they certainly can do wrong, where wrong is a measure of actions that naturally spur subjects to revolt (psychologically or politically) or, if they are fighting a war for that sovereign, lay down their arms. I say “naturally” because this will happen no matter what the sovereign commands, the state ideology extols, or the science of politics dictates; it is a function of human nature. Hence, Hobbes’s practical advice to sovereigns is to be eternally vigilant of how they hold themselves publicly and privately. Theories of obligation are one thing; leadership is quite another. Sovereign inequity, cowardice, greed, vanity, rashness, pompousness, arrogance, deference to vain elites, and, most fundamentally, sovereign barbarity—flagrant sovereign vice—are naturally dishonorable. Subjects may not have any right to disobey—at no point do I argue that such a right exists—but they will nevertheless. That is Hobbes’s point. Both theories and ideologies of obligation and facts of natural obligation are in play; the latter deserves far more attention. Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan attempts to put those considerations at the center of the debate.

Response to the Commentators

Diego Rosello and Andrés Rosler point to missing lines of analysis, while Meghan Robison asserts significant interpretative errors. I take each in turn.

Rosello

Rossello’s first and second objections are that vital elements of Hobbes’s philosophy—his scientific method and materialism—are unaddressed. Both points are accurate, and the book is worse off because of those shortcomings. To respond, let me sketch how I was thinking about the relationship between materialism, the scientific method, and my arguments. I do so, noting that I will invite many more objections, but it may clarify my thinking.

Instead of thinking about materialism or the scientific methods abstractly or separately, we need to frame them within Hobbes’s philosophy of history. Hobbes had a philosophy of history that amounts to a history of theology and materialism, mediated by epistemology, where the latter is the only variable element and, thus, the driving force of meta-historical change. Materialism is the ontological claim that all there is matter in motion, meaning that Aristotelian metaphysical realism or Cartesian mind/body dualism, for example, are philosophically wrong (they may be politically or ideologically operative, but that is a separate question).

Theology—not this or that religious faith, but the universal human trait of belief—is an emergent property of the prior universal of human curiosity. Curiosity is fickle; in the first instance, it is the human pox generating corrosive and, for the vast majority, unbearable psychic strife streaming from an endless search for prior causation. Save for the rare philosophical soul, curiosity constitutively obliterates cognitive foundations, a sense of meaning, for persons and societies. “God,” for Hobbes, is that bundle of ideas that allow curiosity—regarding the meaning of one’s life, community, society, and place in the cosmos—to rest. “God” is that bundle of ideas that enables the vast majority of humanity to stop searching for a yet deeper cause by standing as the cause. That “God” is the lodestone of human dignity, human civility, and peace. It is a feign of universality wherein the feint is best left unapparent.

Epistemology is the cognitive apparatus mediating materialism and curiosity. Unlike materialism and curiosity, epistemology is a human construct. For Hobbes, the history of that construction is the history of humanity. Hobbes charts four epistemic eras. To understand that history, we need to start at the end. The correct epistemology—the one that gets the ontology and theology right—is, for Hobbes, nominalism and, therethrough, the scientific method of resolution, composition, definition, and logical reasoning. Truth is a function of sound nominalist scientific reasoning as a principle of inquiry and, crucially, because that method accommodates the truth of materialism and curiosity. Politically, it is the epistemology least prone to vainglory and all the strife that follows because it is self-aware that the universals in play are attributes of language (not, as will be seen, nodes to eternal essences).

Now, let me wind back the clock. Nominalism and the scientific method needed to be discovered. That discovery process involved much good fortune, mistakes, and muddling through, hampered by corrosive and vainglorious politics made worse by corrosive and vainglorious epistemologies. The first era is pre-linguistic, where experience is unmediated by epistemology, where immediate sense experience provides causal accounting of events, and no causes before that, or in general, are considered. Here, humans are no different than animals. The second era follows the invention of words (interestingly, in Leviathan, Hobbes changes it to the invention of speech), up to Socrates or perhaps Pythagoras. The pre-Socratic city-states were internally peaceful because there were no absurdities of vainglorious essences, rulers defined “God,” the epistemic framework allowed as much, and material world mirrored the polyarchy of the heavens. The sovereign ruled over both political and theological matters, and peace followed. The pre-Socratic epistemology was, for Hobbes, quite wrong—it was not scientific in any sense—but it had the real virtue of getting the politics right, and internal peace followed.

The post-Socratic moment—Socrates, Plato, worse Aristotle, even worse Aristotelians, and worst of all, the vainglorious theologies built upon Aristotelian absurdities—was a function of an epistemic revolution that mistook an exception (geometry, where language captures logical truths which appear radically independent of materialism) with the rule. Confusing the exception for the rule, the epistemology posits essences in all matters of investigation without recognizing that the universals in play are merely properties of common nouns. Promulgating those ideas through a corrupted early church, Aristotelianism functions as a necessary obfuscator of the material world while simultaneously moving any definition of “God” beyond sovereign control. In essence, the Aristotelianism is an epistemological generator of the most radical vainglory, whereby individuals confuse their own thought (words) with access to transcendental truths. That, for Hobbes, is the root of two millennia of human and political discord.

Hobbes’s political science is the first work of true political science because it is the first nominalist political science. The political manifestation of that philosophical step forward is where the real challenges begin. If nominalism is correct, then the challenge facing Hobbes’s sovereign is to both understand the nominalist and materialist philosophy that is the truth of the world while, first, also ruling over the vast majority of citizens who will never get anywhere near the philosophical debates at hand, and need a “God” all the same. Second, that sovereign must waging a transhistorical war against hegemonic Aristotelianism which has captured the minds of the elite both in aristocratic culture and the church. That, it seems to me, is the operative political theological background of Leviathan. If so, a crucial interpretative point follows. Leviathan as a text may be able to carry some of the water for this enterprise in the long term, at least in elite circles and universities. But the text will never be read by the masses. And that is the rub: the only way to bridge the masses and the sovereign is through public actions and deeds of the sovereign. That is, for Hobbes, a question of character and culture.

Again, this ultra-rough sketch is not meant to address Rosello’s fair criticisms but merely gesture toward where I think a complete response would go.

            Rosello’s third point—that I do not engage in the mirror of princes tradition—is also quite right. He points to low-hanging fruit that I simply leave dangling. I only note that such an engagement could prove definitive in all the ways that robust historical contextualization does. So, for example, much of my analysis stands on simple textual readings of Leviathan, positing that many passages do not mean what they are often taken to mean. Well, it is entirely possible that a more sophisticated contextualization of those passages—in the mirror of princes tradition or any other tradition—could show decisively that Hobbes was writing ironically, cryptically, esoterically, or what have you. That kind of account could plausibly disprove mine. Note, though, that that is also necessary if one wants to defend, rather than simply state, such a position. Of course, the opposite may happen: historical contextualization could be decisive in supporting or furthering the discussion of virtue in Hobbes’s political theory.

Rosler

Unfortunately, my response to Rosler will be brief because I think we are more or less in agreement. Rosler’s discussion of Hart and Warrender, and Warrender’s account of Hobbes and Hart’s reading of Warrender, put my footnote-length gesture towards these debates to shame. I would only note in support of Rosler that these kinds of perplexities regarding the nature of law, legitimacy, and politics follow from taking Hobbes at his word. The passages highlighted by Rosler are, indeed, baffling. Take the “reputed voyd” discussion. In his edition of Leviathan, Noel Malcolm notes forthrightly what most scholars presumably thought but did not address, namely that the “reputed voyd” passage appears to be incompatible with the standard model, so it must be a mistake. One benefit of the virtue-first critique of Hobbes is that these and similar passages make more sense: what Hobbes seems to imply is that sovereign vice, when pushed to extremes, begins to look a lot like a war against citizens, which, if true, means that the social covenant is, indeed, reputed void. Of course, this is a poor response to Rosler’s discussion because, at that point, fascinating legal questions are obviated—because it is not a sovereign and citizens, but enemies at war. In other words, there is no question of legal legitimacy in predatory regimes; it is a state of war, not a civil state. The baffling questions primarily apply before that point because the citizens of a well-run state typically do not consider themselves to be needing virtuous sovereigns, partly because they do not see the law as pure command. Instead, they see the law as reflecting the social covenant (a point which I will return to in response to Robison next).

Robison

Robison strikes exactly at the interpretative heart of the project, reading the text more or less at face value and asserting that I have got it more or less wrong. Robison starts with a passage in Leviathan concerning the two possible modes (“seeds”) of religion, which I take to be two kinds of founders. Robison points out, quite correctly, that Hobbes writes that

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction[.][2]

Then Robison asserts, again following Hobbes, that the distinction is between humane and divine, not two sorts of human. The problem is that the passage quoted by Robison unambiguously establishes that Hobbes is writing of “two sorts of men.” So, how do we reconcile “two sorts of men” with the humane/divine distinction? We are well served by attending to Hobbes’s definition of curiosity. On that account, “divine” and human are ontologically indistinguishable (to assert otherwise would be to also necessarily assert that Hobbes’s materialism is not what it seems). The difference, I believe, regards modes of representation. One claims direct representation, one indirect, but both represent a bundle of ideas that bring curiosity to rest. From that perspective, what Robison asserts to be Hobbes’s main point is immaterial, at least to my argument.

 Robison then dovetails those concerns into the next criticism regarding the nature of character. Robison first states the following:

When Hobbes explains the necessity of the failure of a regime as the people’s lack of belief in the founder, Hoye assumes that the founder’s character is what grounds his authority. But what seems relevant for Hobbes, in my view, is the people’s belief in the founder’s character, not the founder’s character itself.

We can meet halfway insofar as I assume, perhaps like Robison, that one’s character and the public’s perception of that character are dynamically related and modulating in practice. What matters is the people’s belief in the founder’s character, but of course, that depends on the enactment of the sovereign’s character. My arguments assume a dynamic relation. Indeed, this is a point I develop at length in Chapters Three and Four as it is central to the whole tradition of virtue ethics and acutely important in the discussion of rhetorical action. The difference between perceived character and actual character is crucial, ever-present, impossible to resolve, and thus a constant concern of the sovereign (at least, any sovereign hoping to keep the peace and keep their head). It is, again, central to the discussion of the fool (which, it is worth stressing is a discussion of new foundations, virtue, and vice). Of course, that is all in the very nature of sincerity, honesty, love, and other-regarding virtues. Again, as I develop at length and by way of many examples from the text, this is a point that Hobbes repeats over and over. Indeed, Robison appears to agree with me, concluding that “Moreover, and more importantly, Hobbes claims that when a people living under a religious government become sceptical about the character of their leader—that if they are sceptical about that character, then they will necessarily be sceptical of the religion.” Exactly.

            Having conceded that the issue is about character and the people’s perception of their sovereign’s character, Robison then asserts that it is not about character at all. Robison narrows in on the final part of a long paragraph on the political-theological calamities that follow from corrupt (unwise, unloving, insincere, prophane) bishops and foreign popes. Hobbes writes:

Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales or Purgatory; with others signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that had presumed most of Reformation.[3]

It is undoubtedly a convoluted passage, but we agree that the critical line is “if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it …” and therein, the kicker being “did not more.” I take it to mean that the sovereign must hold itself, and sustain a suitable public culture, that eclipses the particular failings of priests and teachers. Robison seems to take “did not more” as a rejection of the place of character in maintaining faith.

How can we decide which is correct? One is to look at the chapter. For instance, the paragraph immediately preceding it makes essentially the same point, arguing that sovereigns must attend to the conduct of deputies (judges, priests, ambassadors) as their deeds rebound back on the sovereign because they are, effectively, representatives. This is not to say that one poor judgment will ruin a regime—basic human failings are taken into account—but it is to say that persistent, recurrent, and self-indulgent failings amass, and when they do, the regime follows suit. As Hobbes writes: “So that Justice faylingh, Faith also fayled”[4]; “as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People[.]”[5] Another way is to consider the Latin version of the text. There Hobbes writes that:

There is no one who does not understand the nature and purpose of indulgences, private masses, and many other things unnecessary to the people’s salvation, and how much power they have to extinguish even the most lively faith, were that faith not sustained by the civil power and by custom.[6]

That, it seems to me, supports my interpretation. Everything we know about sustaining faith in Hobbes—spelled out in xii and across Leviathan—indicates that Hobbes is not asserting that “civil power” means some abstract institutional metric but that it relates to the foundations of religious power: love, wisdom, sincerity, and divine revelation.

            I should add—and here I am unfairly moving beyond the scope of Robison’s criticisms—that by focusing only on the few passages from xii, Robison leaves unmentioned that Hobbes expressly states—in the introduction and conclusion, throughout the text, and at crucial moments, and tracked with endless long quotations in the book—exactly that sovereign character is the paramount consideration. Those passages, even in general, must be weighed against criticisms like Robison’s because they flesh out the implications of Robison’s claim, namely, that they must be dismissed as slips of the pen, ignored, or treated as Hobbes getting his own ideas wrong. Maybe that is correct, but I doubt it.

            Robison concludes by asserting a kind of democratic social covenant where the people make “by their own art” a community founded upon human agreement. That is true as a question of ideology, but even then, only under the most placid political conditions. But on any political analysis of the crucial moments in the life of a state—foundations, crises, wars, civil tumult— and certainly from the perspective of the sovereign as a political person, that answer is insufficient. When Hobbes writes about the practical politics of establishing a religion (one-half of sovereignty), he always speaks of individual founders. When he writes of the practical politics of establishing a new regime (the other half), he always speaks of individual conquerors or exceptional individuals. For this reason, Hobbes calls the people the “matter” and not, the “maker” of the commonwealth, the latter term being reserved for individual founders.

Hobbes is very eager to have everyone think they are co-authors of this enterprise, but that is the trick of constitutive rhetorical action: making the many simultaneously and willfully consent—which functionally means self-ostracization from political power—while simultaneously believing (maybe rightly) that the ruler is the rightful sovereign. My point is that we need to attend to the difference between the descriptive surface of the social covenant, and the analytical heart of the matter wherein eminently virtuous leaders have crafted the values of the subjects. Certainly, the post-foundational period in the life of a regime—let’s call it normal politics—is conducive to the kind of social covenantal ideology noted by Robison and theorized by Hobbes. But even here, we should recognize that the operative dynamic is tenuous. We know so because of what Hobbes says happens the moment the sovereign slips up and dabbles in vice. At that moment, the entire apparatus begins to unfold, not despite but because of that ideology: the people see eminent sovereign vice and say to themselves, I did not authorize that (it is, in other words “reputed voyd”). I think that is key. My interpretation does not discount the standard model; it takes it seriously. It merely focuses on another set of questions related to real politics that follows from the standard model. What they amount to are enormous burdens (Sorell’s term) on the natural person of the sovereign. Such burdens are depicted in the frontispiece: large-souled sovereign, standing above and apart from the war-torn boroughs, with the masses all standing in awe, breathlessly and silently united, but in constant evaluation of the character of the sovereign.

A Note of Thanks

Thanks again to Gonzalo Bustamante Kuschel, Diego Rosello, Andrés Rosler Meghan Robison. I would also like to take this opportunity to once again thank Roy Tsao and Andrew Corsa for their comments on the manuscript.


[1] This section directly replicates or paraphrases the introduction to Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan.

[2] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm, vol. II, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 170.

[3] Hobbes, II:186.

[4] Hobbes, II:184.

[5] Hobbes, II:184.

[6] Hobbes, II:186.

EUROPEAN HOBBES SOCIETY ONLINE COLLOQUIUM: SOVEREIGNTY AS A VOCATION IN HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (3)

This online colloquium is dedicated to discussing Matthew Hoye’s book, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan. The discussion will commence with three critical commentaries, presented by Diego Rossello, Andrés Rosler and Meghan Robison. The author will then respond to his critics. We extend our gratitude to Amsterdam University Press for their support of this colloquium.

Meghan Robison

Montclair State University

Foundations in J. Matthew Hoye’s Sovereignty as a Vocation: New Foundations Statecraft and Virtue in Hobbes’s Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes is well-known for advancing an original justification of sovereignty. Those who studied Leviathan in university likely remember Hobbes as arguing that state power is legitimized by subjects’ consensual surrender of rights in exchange for protection. J. Matthew Hoye contends that we have misunderstood the nature of Hobbesian sovereignty. In Sovereignty as a Vocation: New Foundations, Statecraft, and Virtue, Hoye argues against the interpretative tradition, claiming the character of the Hobbesian sovereign, rather than subjects’ consent, legitimizes his authority.

While I am not fully convinced by Hoye’s argument, his focus on Hobbes a theorist of new political foundations makes a valuable contribution to contemporary Hobbes scholarship. To further the conversation about new foundations that this book reinvigorates, I provide a critical reconstruction of the key steps in Hoye’s interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of new foundations in Chapter Five of Sovereignty as Vocation.[1]

Hoye begins by asserting that the basic outline of Hobbes’ theory of new foundations overlooks the pivotal discussion of foundations presented in Chapter Twelve, an oversight he seeks to correct. He contrasts his approach with what he calls “The Standard Model,” which begins with the Hobbesian State of Nature—a condition in which human beings live in perpetual fear of violent death.[2] According to the Standard Model, the multitude escapes the State of Nature by surrendering their power to an individual or a group, thereby making that person or persons sovereign.[3] Hoye finds this interpretation inadequate due to its overemphasis on the productive role of fear in the foundation of the Commonwealth.[4] As an alternative, he suggests that sovereignty and political unity are derived from the character of the sovereign: ‘new foundations depend on exceptionally wise, sincere, loving, and revelatory leaders who can unite the multitude into a commonwealth without threatening violence, instead instantiating justice before the creation of a commonwealth’.[5]

On Hoye’s reading, Hobbes’ begins to advance his character-based theory of new foundations in Chapter Twelve of Leviathan. I quote him at length:

But Hobbes starts by laying out a general account of new foundations. Public religions can be founded in two ways. ‘[T]hese seeds have received culture from two sorts of men,’ Hobbes begins. ‘One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandment, and direction.’ In the Latin edition of Leviathan, the former is described as having ‘set themselves up as authors of religions, according to their own invention’ The foundational politics of the ancients teach the ‘humane Politiques’ of effective obligation, and ‘Divine Politiques’ teach sovereigns how to hold themselves.[6]

Let’s reconstruct Hoye’s interpretation. First, he claims that in the discussion of ‘Public Religion’ Hobbes is not explaining ‘two different kinds of founding’ but offering two ‘different perspectives on the founder’.’[7] Secondly, Hoye interprets the passage as giving a positive account of founding: that is, he takes Hobbes to be explaining how states should be founded and how sovereigns should ‘hold themselves’. Finally, Hoye argues that the Hobbesian founder is a ‘type’ of man, that is, one who is motivated to pacify and civilize his dependents for own well-being.[8]

These claims are foundational for Hoye’s interpretation, but it is not clear to me that they are foundational for Hobbes’ argument. In the passage cited, Hobbes is explaining two ways in which ‘the natural seeds of religion were cultured’ and distinguishing the two ways according to two kinds of men not in terms of their character but to their own relation to ‘culturing’:

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they that have nourished and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other have done it by God’s commandment and direction.[9]

Hobbes also claims that both types of men had the same purpose, ‘to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society’, as Hoye points out, however, Hoye misinterprets the main point. Hobbes is elaborating the two ways that ‘the natural seed of religion’ have ‘received culture’ in order to distinguish two kinds of politics, human and divine as directed by God or by a human being. He says that Commonwealths are ‘human’ but he is makes no claims about the sovereign’s character in this passage.

The second step of Hoye’s interpretation is built upon Hobbes’ account of political collapse. To cite Hoye at length once again:

Hobbes begins [his discussion of collapse] by characterizing a subject’s faith in the founder—‘’in some one person’—as based on the belief that the founder will ‘labour to procure their happiness’, as the author of the religion. He then turns to the reasons why regimes fail. Each of Hobbes’s answers involves the subjects’ evaluation of the sovereign’s conduct. ‘It followeth necessarily,’ Hobbes writes, that when they that have the Government of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected. These four traits—wisdom, sincerity, love, and divine revelation—all turn on the character of the founder.[10]

In Hoye’s interpretation, Hobbes attributes the failure of political regimes to the people’s negative evaluation of the founder’s character. Inverting this idea, Hoye argues that a positive evaluation of the founder’s character—and he identifies four characteristics—is essential for the successful founding of a regime. In the following section, he examines each of the four traits that he believes Hobbes identifies as characteristics of a virtuous founder. Drawing on passages from various chapters of Leviathan, Hoye constructs a Hobbesian account of what makes a founder wise, sincere, loved, and so forth.

Since I am focusing on the foundations of Hoye’s interpretation of Hobbes’ theory, I will focus on the main interpretative question: Is Hobbes advancing a theory of new foundations centred on the founder’s character, as Hoye suggests? If we return to the passage from Leviathan, we see Hobbes claim that ‘formed religion’ is founded on certain beliefs about the founder: ‘For seeing all formed religion is founded at first upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man to whom God Himself vouchsafeth to declare His will supernaturally’.[11] Hobbes does not stop here. On the basis of this observation, he goes on to make the following conclusion:

it followeth necessarily when they that have the government of religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected, or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation, that the religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and (without the fear of the civil sword) contradicted and rejected.[12]

When Hobbes explains the necessity of the failure of a regime as the people’s lack of belief in the founder, Hoye assumes that the founder’s character is what grounds his authority. But what seems relevant for Hobbes, in my view, is the people’s belief in the founder’s character, not the founder’s character itself. Moreover, and more importantly, Hobbes claims that when a people living under a religious government become sceptical about the character of their leader—that if they are sceptical about that character, then they will necessarily be sceptical of the religion.

In this passage, then, Hobbes does not claim that certain traits—wisdom, sincerity, love, divinity—are necessary characteristics of a founder. He is not trying to advance a positive theory of political founding or presenting a character study of a model founder and sovereign. Instead, he is issuing a warning: governments established on the basis of the people’s faith in the character of a leader are vulnerable to collapse precisely because they are based on belief in the leader. He concludes the chapter ‘On Religion’ by criticizing authority based on faith in spiritual leaders:

who does not see to whose profit redound the fees of private Masses, and vales of purgatory, with other signs of private interest enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, as I said, the civil magistrate and custom did not more sustain it than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause, and that is unpleasing priests; and those not only amongst catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of reformation.[13]

Hobbes warns us about the stability of authority based on opinion. He argues that even the liveliest faith can be mortified ‘if it is not sustained by something more than the opinion the people have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers. Contrary to what Hoye claims, Hobbes suggests that sovereignty based on the people’s faith in the sovereign alone are inherently unstable, and that it can only be sustained by the authority of the civil magistrate and custom.

Hoye wisely recommends including the discussion of religion in Chapter Twelve of Leviathan as an essential part of Hobbes’ theory of new political foundations. This discussion plays a crucial role by creating space for the Hobbesian Commonwealth as a new kind of political body—not as formed by an individual ‘miracle representer driven by a divine calling’[14] as Hoye suggests, but as made by ordinary human beings who, by their own ‘art’, make themselves into a law-governed state. Commonwealth-making begins with the making of pacts and covenants, agreements in which individuals mutually renounce their ‘natural right to all things’. As a community founded on human agreement, the foundations of the Hobbesian Commonwealth are never ‘the stuff of individual founders’[15]. They are plural: they are the many who, together, make themselves one.


[1] Hoye, J. Matthew, Sovereignty as a Vocation: New Foundations, Statecraft, and Virtue (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2024), p. 182

[2] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 161.

[3] “The standard model runs roughly as follows: The ‘state of nature’, a term Hobbes does not use in Leviathan, is experienced as a period of relentless fear and trepidation. To exit this condition, a ‘social contract’, another term Hobbes does not use in Leviathan, is forged whereby the multitude confers their power on one person (or group of persons) who is thereby sovereign,” Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p.162.

[4] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 161

[5] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 161

[6] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 166.

[7] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 166.

[8] Hoye goes on to support this interpretation by invoking Hobbes’ discussion of ‘the first founders and Legislators of Commonwealths’ which he describes as a ‘classic discussion of the law-giver’. He does not say why this a classic discussion of the law-giver. Instead, he turns to consider specific founders that Hobbes names, starting with the Roman king Numa. To describe Numa’s character, Hoye cites passages from Livy and Plutarch (not Hobbes) in which the authors respectively laud the king’s ability to persuade his subjects to obey by words and deeds rather than violence. Hoye assumes that Hobbes shares this view of Numa and, therefore, considering him to be an exemplary founder and bases his own theory of political foundations on this idea of a founder. See Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 167.

[9] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (New York: Penguin, 1985). p. 173.

[10] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 262.

[11] Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 179

[12] Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 179.

[13] Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 182-3.

[14] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 209.

[15] Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation, p. 209.

EUROPEAN HOBBES SOCIETY ONLINE COLLOQUIUM: SOVEREIGNTY AS A VOCATION IN HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (2)

This online colloquium is dedicated to discussing Matthew Hoye’s book, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan. The discussion will commence with three critical commentaries, presented by Diego Rossello, Andrés Rosler and Meghan Robison. The author will then respond to his critics. We extend our gratitude to Amsterdam University Press for their support of this colloquium.

son. The author will then respond to his critics. We extend our gratitude to Amsterdam University Press for their support of this colloquium.

Andrés Rosler

Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET

Calling Sovereign Virtue

At first glance, if told about the very recent publication of J. Matthew Hoye’s book, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan, it is more than likely any reader interested in Hobbes’s political theory—particularly his Leviathan—would go: “just what the world needs, another book on Hobbes and sovereignty”. However, the very reference to the combination of sovereignty and vocation in the title of the book indicates that its subject-matter is not just another day in the office of Hobbesian studies in that the idea of sovereignty is not understood in simply institutional or impersonal terms, or as a quasi-theological affair indicating the workings of some kind of God. This is a book that aims at showing how the concrete virtues of the natural person (or persons) of the sovereign bear upon the abstract “Seat of Power”.

           Mind you, as Hoye states, there has been no shortage of scholarship on Hobbes dealing with moral and civic virtue in the latter’s political work. However, that is the point: most of that scholarship focuses on the virtue of the sovereign’s citizens but not on the virtue of sovereign agency in itself (8, 20, 135, 179, 260).[1] Hoye’s work stands out as an impressive attempt to show how “the virtues of the natural person bearing the office of the sovereign suffuse Hobbes’s political philosophy” (7). Hoye has certainly a point that if Hobbes’s purpose is to teach “both how to govern, and how to obey” (8), Hobbesian scholarship has been largely interested in explaining only half of Hobbes’s purpose, viz. how subjects and/or citizens are supposed to obey, but not quite in showing how the sovereign is supposed to govern. Any reader of this book will have to agree that “teaching sovereigns ‘how to rule’ is fundamentally important to Leviathan’s political philosophy” (9), as important as teaching citizens how to obey.

           Hoye shows that although Hobbes’s Leviathan has a lot to say about the need of sovereignty (including institutional design, law, etc.) to keep deep political strife at bay, Hobbes is also keen on showing how “any sovereign who acts like a stereotypical Hobbesian agent is sure to invite discord, civil war, and perhaps their own destruction, all at their own fault” (9). So, even if “taken from the perspective of Hobbes’s discussion of the subject’s obedience, the sovereign can do no wrong”, “taken from the perspective of Hobbes’s discussion of that sovereign’s character, they most certainly can do wrong, where wrong is a measure of actions that naturally spur subjects to revolt, no matter what the sovereign commands, the state ideology extols, or the science of politics dictates” (20). There appears to be then some sort of “moral causation” behind Hobbes’s recommendations to sovereign agents about how to act in so far as moral virtue can contribute to empirical analysis and avoid some undesirable results:[2] “Subjects may not have any right to disobey…, but they will nevertheless. That is Hobbes’s point. (…). Sovereign vice rots out the state. What remains is a real threat of civil war and a pervasive desire by the multitude (informed by experience) for a new founder, a leader of eminent virtue” (20).

           For obvious spatial reasons in what follows I’d like to concentrate my attention on one single aspect of the book, namely Hoye’s reluctance to subscribe what he calls “the ‘orthodox’, ‘traditional’, or ‘standard’ view of Hobbes as a forefather of legal positivism” (216). Hoye assumes that Hobbes’s insistence on sovereigns to take natural justice seriously is not compatible with legal positivism. Still, I’d say that it is not all that easy to expel Hobbes from the camp of legal positivism.

           According to Hoye, “Hobbes is neither a positivist, in H. L. A. Hart’s sense…, nor a command theorist, in John Austin’s sense…. In both cases, the reason is that the ultimate source of civil law’s legitimacy is the social contract” (216, n. 2). It is absolutely true that Hart and Austin are not contractarian thinkers. However, part of the point of subscribing to legal positivism is that legal positivism keeps the normativity of law aloof from its legitimacy. Hence, legal positivism may well be go hand in hand with different accounts of legitimacy: contractarian, utilitarian, etc. Contemporary legal positivism treats this as a conceptual matter, but in Hobbes’s case this is explained mainly by political reasons. The only way to keep, say, civil war at bay is to avoid bringing moral or political guests into a legal party. This is the original beauty of the command theory of law.

           Secondly, Hoye claims that “Contrary to Hart, Hobbes makes clear that where the civil laws are antithetical to the natural laws, they are in fact simple coercion” (216, n. 2). Hoye seems to rely on a passage often neglected by Hobbesian scholarship, a rather baffling statement in Leviathan, chapter XXIV, regarding the distribution of lands by the sovereign made “in prejudice” of “the common Peace and Security”, a distribution that Hobbes takes to be “contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd” (225, emphasis added by Hoye). This statement seems to be behind Hoye’s claim that “Hobbes makes clear that where the civil laws are antithetical to the natural laws, then the civil laws lose their force, and although they are still promulgated as laws, they are in fact simple coercion” (216, n. 2). Hobbes’s claim is a puzzling statement since the sovereign may well breach natural law but that does not affect the legal normativity of his dispositions.

           It is even more perplexing that having taken the high road of natural law, Hobbes immediately adds that this distribution of land may well be “a breach of trust and of the Law of the Nature; but this is not enough to authorize any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own” (225). This distribution then may well be taken to be legally void by the citizens, but it has much the same practical effect as any legally binding disposition enacted by the sovereign. Perhaps it is mainly a question of reputation: subjects are to repute void what is actually legally binding.

           Now there is reason to believe that Hart himself felt rather close to Hobbes’s political philosophy. For instance, in his essay “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons”, in which he sets out to explain his theory of legal authority on the basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence, Hart holds that “the main criticism” which he makes to Bentham “was first suggested to me by Hobbes who said some simple but illuminating things about commands and the similarity between commands and covenants as sources of obligation or as obligation-creating acts”. Hart immediately adds: “But I do not thing I should have seen the full importance of Hobbes’s remarks on these topics had I not had the benefit of the work of Joseph Raz on what he terms ‘exclusionary reasons’ which resembles in many respects the notion which I have taken from Hobbes”.[3] Hart’s reference to Raz is also revealing since at Oxford Hart used to prescribe “a tough course of reading in what he saw as the philosophical classics pertaining to the student topic’s”, and Raz—who wrote his doctoral dissertation under Hart’s supervision—recalled that the latter “didn’t make suggestions except for some strategic things: for example: ‘Do I have to read anything by Hobbes in order to say anything about him? («Yes!»)’”.[4] 

           Furthermore, and this goes to the very heart of his theory of law, in a working notebook en route to The Concept of Law, Hart already states his key idea of “the notion of a rule binding valid by virtue of its ‘source’ not content”, which is a theme on the variation of the content-independent nature of commands in Hobbes’s case and of rules in Hart’s. Now Hart’s notebook is rather scarce regarding reference to other authors: “Hans Kelsen is the only theorist who appears to preoccupy Herbert (his few companions being John Austin, Jerome Frank, Thomas Hobbes, and the Hobbes scholar Howard Warrender, of whom only the last gets more than one mention)”.[5] Indeed, Hart writes down in his notebook that: “Obligation as the differential of modern nature of law but caricatured by command. This is likely to become central idée maitresse of the book. What principles are may become clear in course of reading Warrender in this can I draw my distinction between the command habit caricature and the far more central notion of rule-like acceptance”.[6]

           It goes without saying that Hart is making reference to Howard Warrender’s classical study on Hobbes’s theory of obligation: The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford University Press, 1957), which came out not long before or perhaps just when Hart started working on his masterpiece The Concept of Law. If I’d have to select a single text from Warrander’s book that may have caught Hart’s eye I’d put my money on the following passage: “The reason why the individual ought to obey the civil law is, in the first place, that he has covenanted to do so, and not that the punishments of the sovereign bring it about that obedience is in his interest. This is made more evident by Hobbes in a passage where he distinguishes between the citizens being obliged to obey the covenant for its own sake, and ‘being tied being obliged’, or being compelled by the sanctions of the civil law to honour his obligations”.[7] The passage by Hobbes at stake (in De cive, chapter XIV.2) sounds remarkably Hartian: “Some have thought that being obligated and being kept to one’s obligation are the same thing and that consequently this is a verbal not a substantial distinction. So I will put it more clearly. A man is obligated by an agreement, i.e. he ought to perform of his promise. But he is kept to his obligation by a law, i.e. he is compelled to performance by fear of the penalty laid down in the law”.[8] Of course, Hart prefers to understand obligations in terms of general social practices rather than in contractarian terms, but there is a remarkable Hobbesian air to Hart’s distinction between having an obligation to do something and being obliged to do it.[9]

           The same applies naturally to Hart’s corresponding distinction between the internal and the external viewpoints on obligation and Hobbes’s distinction between obligations in foro interno and in foro externo. Warrender explains that: “The obligations of man in the State of Nature can be made to show very different characteristics according to the perspective from which they are described”. The very same obligation “considered from the point of view of the individual living in the State of Nature” would be seen in a different light by “outside observer… who contemplates the condition of men in the State of Nature”: “In this condition [the State of Nature] men may discharge their obligations, but in their relations with their fellow men, they may present to the external observer forms of behaviour which would be consistent with a situation in which no obligations existed whatsoever. (…). Even if the State of Nature were a condition of security, but still a condition where every man had to interpret the law for himself, duty could be completely discharged with each man obeying his version of natural law, but men could still present the external appearance of living in a state without obligations”.[10] Of course, the content of Hobbes’s distinction does not correspond entirely to Hart’s, but the point is that their structure is quite the same: obligations look rather different if seen from the internal and the external viewpoint, if not entirely non-existent.

           To conclude, Hoye’s new book on Hobbes with its salutary emphasis on natural virtue as a vocation for sovereigns is a correction to the somewhat exaggerated attention paid to the impersonal nature of Leviathan and a refreshing challenge for anyone interested in Hobbes’s political philosophy.


[1] Unless otherwise stated, numbers between brackets refer to J. Matthew Hoye, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan: New Foundations, Statecraft, and Virtue, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004.

[2] For the idiom “moral causation” see Terence Irwin. “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle”, History of Political Thought 6 (1985): 154, 163.

[3] Hart, H. L. A. Essays on Bentham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, 244.

[4] Nicola Lacey. A life of H. L. A. Hart. The Nightmare and the Noble Dream. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 161.

[5] Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart, 227 (emphasis added).

[6] Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart, 228.

[7] Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 205.

[8] Thomas Hobbes, On the citizen, edited by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 155.

[9] See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., edited by Penelope Bulloch and Joseph Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 82-90.

[10] Howard Warrender. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 68-70.

EUROPEAN HOBBES SOCIETY ONLINE COLLOQUIUM: SOVEREIGNTY AS A VOCATION IN HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (1)

This online colloquium is dedicated to discussing Matthew Hoye’s book, Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan. The discussion will commence with three critical commentaries, presented by Diego Rossello, Andrés Rosler and Meghan Robison. The author will then respond to his critics. We extend our gratitude to Amsterdam University Press for their support of this colloquium.

Diego Rossello

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

Remarks on J. Matthew Hoye’s Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2024.

Hoye’s book is a welcomed addition to the growing literature on Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. The main argument of the book, clearly laid out in the Introduction, takes shape in contrast with two predominant approaches: the natural right/egoistic and the natural law/deontological. Hoye’s book departs from these approaches as it seeks to shed light on Hobbes’s statecraft from the perspective of virtue ethics (10). However, whereas conventional academic wisdom asserts that Leviathan is a book dedicated to why subjects should obey the sovereign state, Hoye’s suggests that it is a book on how the sovereign should govern its subjects. Thus, according to the author, Leviathan should not be understood primarily as invested in making the science of politics impersonal, abstract and logically tight, like geometry. On the contrary, Hoye approaches Leviathan from the perspective of virtue ethics applied to the natural person of the sovereign. By focusing on virtue ethics, Hoye chooses to stress the humanist and rhetorical dimensions of Leviathan while remaining inattentive to other aspects of Hobbes’s work.

Hoye’s reading of Hobbes shifts focus from the legitimacy crisis that opposed monarchists to parliamentarians to the research agenda of recent urban historians who recuperate the republican political theory of boroughs. Hoye suggests that Hobbes simultaneously receives and reorients the main tenets of borough republicanism, providing a replacement for them in Leviathan. According to Hoye, the “modern representative fictional state” (61) allowed future sovereigns to avoid ancient conceptions of democracy as well as democratic and oligarchic communal republicanism. Since Hoye’s main interest is to show how Hobbes contributes to understanding “how founders and sovereigns persuade the multitude and citizens in practice” (71), he introduces what he calls “rhetorical action” (69). This strategy leads Hoye to recuperate the rhetorical tradition from Aristotle to Cicero and Quintilian, exploring issues related to the theatricality of rhetoric, as well as its connection with authenticity and inauthenticity of intentions. Hoye also lays out how classical rhetoric is received in Late Renaissance and Early Modern philosophy, particularly in terms of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio. According to Hoye, Hobbes attends to this tradition but at the same time departs from it in important ways.

However, Hoye’s careful reconstruction of the rhetorical tradition and of Hobbes’s idiosyncratic place in it, is fueled by dissatisfaction with what he calls the “standard model” of reading Hobbes’s political theory. This model consists, roughly, of two logical steps: 1) the natural condition, where man is a wolf to man; 2) the social contract that extracts individuals from an –undesirable—natural condition. In Hoye’s words:

The “state of nature,” a term Hobbes does not use in Leviathan, is experienced as a period of relentless fear and trepidation. To exit this condition, a “social contract,” another term Hobbes does not use in Leviathan, is forged whereby the multitude confers their power on one person (or group of persons) who is thereby sovereign. This bundle of ideas informs a panoply of considerations save one: the real politics of new foundations (162).

Hoye’s emphasis on rhetoric leads him to condemn a standard model that fails to honor the most basic tenets of Hobbes’s own vocabulary. More importantly, this model misses the scenario of new foundations that, according to Hoye, does not begin in chapter XIII, but in the relatively ignored chapter XII (161). In fact, Hoye at times presents chapter XII as a symptom that the standard model can neither process nor subsume. In chapter XII Hoye sees Hobbes reflecting on the personal characteristics of the natural person of the sovereign-founder. These characteristics are wisdom, sincerity, love and divine revelation (168). In addition, Hoye sees that chapter as challenging three common topics in Hobbes’s scholarship: 1) human equality; 2) the idea that justice cannot exist prior to the sovereign; and 3) the assertion that there is no real distinction between regimes by institution and contest, since both are based on fear.                                                               

Hoye’s revisionist understanding of Leviathan in light of virtue ethics and rhetorical action is cogently argued and persuasive. The place he assigns to “the instantiation of great virtue in the natural person of the sovereign” (252) is challenging to established narratives on Leviathan’s scope and meaning. However, I believe that Hoye does not explore or develop further implications of his argument. In what follows, I lay out some possible objections to the book’s main argument. Some of these objections can be seen as ‘external,’ as they pertain to alternative approaches to Hobbes’s intellectual project as a whole. Others focus on exploring further implications of Hoye’s argument on the importance of virtue ethics in Leviathan.

My first objection concerns the general orientation of Hoye’s project. To use Noel Malcolm’s expression, there are aspects of Hobbes that remain unattended when the focus is placed on rhetoric and virtue. Two main aspects of Hobbes’s thought remain concealed in Hoye’s reconstruction of Leviathan: early modern science and materialism. In many ways, the more affinities between Hobbes and the rhetorical tradition are explored, the less evident Hobbes’s engagement with emerging scientific and experimental knowledge becomes (Adams 2023). Put differently, emphasizing continuities between Hobbes’s work and late Renaissance rhetorical humanism often risks pulling Hobbes’s work back into a humanistic philosophy that was important to his background but that he was also attempting to leave behind. At times, one can see Quentin Skinner’s Reason and Rhetoric (1996) engaging in a similar pulling back. I wonder what the author may have to say about these aspects of Hobbes, also very present in key passages of chapter XII, where Hobbes acknowledges the intrinsic desire of men to know the ultimate causes of natural bodies.

In relation to bodies, and to the potential invisibilization of early-modern science in Hobbes, the absence of Hobbes’s materialism in the book is striking. Rather unsurprisingly for an approach that privileges virtue and rhetoric, the issue of the nature and implications of Hobbes’s materialism remains simply unexplored, and the works by contemporary scholars that dwell on this question in Hobbes are not addressed—for example, the work of Samantha Frost (2008). This is again surprising for a book that places emphasis on Chapter XII, where the issue of material and immaterial bodies is addressed. Moreover, new materialism is one of the most vibrant contemporary philosophies, claiming Hobbes (and others) as a source of inspiration for understanding ethics and politics in our time. Accordingly, the contextualist approach to Hobbes deployed in the book adds historiographical dexterity, often at the expense of understanding Hobbes’s contribution to our context as well as his own

As I said, the two objections above can be seen as too external to Hoye’s project and the author may have good reasons for simply shrugging his shoulders at them. The last objection has to do with exploring further implications of the argument based on virtue ethics. If we are to accept such an argument, it is difficult not to think of Hobbes in the genre of “mirror for princes” together with works like The Education of the Christian Prince by Erasmus (1997). However, the author does not dwell on this line of interpretation and does not provide much evidence on the reasons why (14; 146). Can perhaps this brief reaction to the book offer an opportunity for the author to re-state his case against assimilating Hobbes’ Leviathan to the mirror for princes’ literature?

Works cited

Erasmus, 1997. The Education of a Christian Prince, edited by Lisa Jardine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frost, Samantha. 2008. Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hoye, Matthew. 2023.  Sovereignty as a Vocation in Hobbes’s Leviathan: New Foundations, Statecraft, and Virtue. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Adams, Marcus P. 2023. “Hobbes’ Philosophy of Science,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/hobbes-science/>.

Skinner, Quentin. 1996. Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy (Scopus)

Call for participation of dossier 2026

Title: Actualidad de la filosofía de Thomas Hobbes (Current relevance of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes)

Guest editors: María Liliana Lukac de Stier (UCA – Argentina) and Andrés Di Leo Razuk (UBA/UNLaM – Argentina).

Article languages: English, Spanish, French.

Summary and objectives:

There is no doubt that any valuable recovery of a classical thinker is primarily motivated by a problematic of the historical moment in which it is taking place. In the specific case of Thomas Hobbes, since the critical recovery of his work at the beginning of the 20th century by thinkers such as Strauss and Schmitt, the British philosopher’s texts have not ceased to be consulted in order to consider a variety of issues. In turn, the richness of Hobbes’ thought can be seen not only in the different interpretations that have been developed of his philosophy, but also in the fact that they are often even antagonistic. Thus, within Hobbesian hermeneutics we find liberal, totalitarian, statist, anarchist, theistic, atheistic, conservative or progressive positions, to mention but a few influential currents, and within each of them, the internal divisions that can be seen only further demonstrate the fruitfulness and versatility of Hobbes’ writings, which provide useful theoretical tools for reflecting on different problems.

This dossier attempts to form part of this intellectual maneuver, proposing to link Hobbes’s thought with current and concrete problems that challenge us today and that have only recently begun to form part of Hobbesian studies. The intention, then, is to bring together in this special issue different treatments that are still emerging in isolation. It should be made clear that, although the focus is on current issues, any submissions to this dossier must apply all the academic rigor involved in approaching and recovering the texts of a classical philosopher such as Hobbes, in order not to de-characterize his work.

The following is a description of the current problematic, treated in the light of Hobbesian thought, which would be included in this dossier. It is thus demonstrated how the 17th century philosopher can be highly topical and provide creative ideas for the resolution of urgent ethical-political conflicts:

– Feminisms

– Drug trafficking

– Terrorism

– Artificial intelligence

– Dissolution of the state and sovereignty

– Multitude as a political category

– Neopunitivism and criminal law

– Anarchisms

– Consumption and addictions

– Privatization of wars

– New political enemies

Deadline for submissions: 15 May 2025

Publication: January 2026

Send to: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/LTDL/about/submissions

For enquiries about the publication, please contact: dileorazuk@gmail.com

Journal Las Torres De Lucca is indexed in Scopus.

New article: “Kierkegaard and Hobbes on the State of Nature.”

Josuah Neoh: “Kierkegaard and Hobbes on the State of Nature”, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 68, 3 (2023): 211-228.

Description

This paper connects Hobbes the political philosopher with Kierkegaard the existentialist philosopher through the prism of the state of nature. It compares Kierkegaard’s account of the emergence of ethical norms from the aesthetic stage of life with Hobbes’s account of the emergence of legal norms from the state of nature. The paper argues that the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society involves, not only a change of state, but also a transformation of self. This view of the relationship between the self and the state sees the Hobbesian state through the lens of the Kierkegaardian self. An internal change takes place within the self when we move from the state of nature to the state.

New article: “The scholastic’s dilemma: Hobbes critique of scholastic politics and papal power on the Leviathan frontispiece.”

Allan Gabrial Cardoso dos Santos: “The scholastic’s dilemma: Hobbes critique of scholastic politics and papal power on the Leviathan frontispiece”, History of European Ideas 50, 1 (2024): 1-16.

Description

The idea that the Leviathan frontispiece offers a visual summary of the contents of the work is widespread. However, the analysis of the frontispiece often under-explores Leviathan’s text or leaves certain iconographic elements aside. In discussions of the Scholastics ‘Dilemma’ emblem, for instance, the image is commonly reduced to a representation of ‘logic’ or ‘scholasticism’, leaving aside the intricate interrelationship between the objects present in the image and their connection with the content of the book. This paper argues that this image helps understanding Hobbes’ critique of Scholastic doctrines and their political effects in Leviathan. For Hobbes, these supposedly pure philosophical concepts either in logic (trident of the ‘Syllogism’) or metaphysics (‘Real/Intentional’ bident) hide a central part of Scholastic thought: a ‘seditious’ political conception claiming that the Pope has an indirect right to temporal power in affairs concerning spiritual matters theory (‘Spiritual/Temporal’ and ‘Direct/Indirect’ bidents). The Scholastic model made the common people believe that the Pope would have at least as much authority as the Sovereign. When faced with the choice between obeying either the Pope or their Civil Sovereign the subjects would find themselves in a dangerous ‘Dilemma’.

New article: “Hobbes against hate speech.”

Teresa M. Bejan: “Hobbes against hate speech”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32, 2 (2024): 247-267.

Description

This article argues that Thomas Hobbes’ analysis of insult or ‘contumely’ prefigures recent developments in moral and political philosophy in striking ways. Specifically, Hobbes’s concerns about the dignitary harms in hate speech went well beyond ‘fighting words’ to the essential role played by expressions of hatred and contempt in making and unmaking social hierarchies. Hobbes’s sensitivity to contumely’s subtle power to constitute social in/equalities recalls recent work in feminist and critical race theory. Yet his expansive solutions – both negative and positive, legal and ethical – also shed light on the difficulties faced by aspirationally egalitarian societies in their efforts to eradicate contempt today.

New article: “Prisoner, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Hobbes on Coercion and Consent.”

Daniel Luban: “Prisoner, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Hobbes on Coercion and Consent”, Journal of the History of Ideas 85, 2 (2024): 185-208.

Description

This article examines Thomas Hobbes’s notorious claim that “fear and liberty are consistent” and therefore that agreements coerced by threat of violence are binding. This view is to a surprising extent inherited from Aristotle, but its political implications became especially striking in the wake of the English Civil War, and Hobbes recast his theory in far-reaching ways between his early works and Leviathan to accommodate it. I argue that Hobbes’s account of coercion is both philosophically safe from the most common objections to it and politically superior to the seemingly commonsensical alternatives that we have inherited from Hobbes’s critics.