This online colloquium has been established to discuss A.P. Martinich’s recent book, Hobbes’s Political Philosophy: Interpretation and Interpretations. We began last week with an introduction to the text. We now have a response from Michael Byron, which will be followed by responses from Andrew Day and Gabriella Slomp, and finally a reply by A. P. Martinich. Many thanks to Oxford University Press for supporting this colloquium.
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I am grateful to Robin Douglass and the European Hobbes Society for
the invitation to participate in this symposium. And I am especially grateful
to Al Martinich, whose work has taught me so much about Hobbes. So it is a
privilege to participate in this forum on Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,
his latest collection of (previously published) work. At Robin’s suggestion, I
have focused on the middle chapters of the book, which concern issues of
sovereignty. I will, however, have nothing to say beyond “thank you” for
chapter 8, where Martinich dismantles Strauss’s seminal interpretation of
Hobbes. As is customary in these symposia, I focus on areas of disagreement,
which belies the significant extent to which I agree with Martinich and the
debt I owe him.
Chapter 7 is Martinich’s last word in his conversation with John
Deigh regarding whether the laws of nature are God’s laws. As many readers will
recall, Deigh (2016, 304–7) builds his “nonlaw” interpretation on Hobbes’s
pronouncement at the end of Leviathan, chapter 15 that the laws of
nature are “dictates of reason” (Hobbes 1651, 15.41/80, using Martinich’s
citation schema that includes chapter and paragraph along with 1651
pagination). Deigh claims that the nonlaw interpretation conforms more closely
to Hobbes’s scientific method, specifically by contending that the definition
of ‘law of nature’ entails that they are not laws. The idea is that ‘law’
changes sense when used in a compound term such as ‘law of nature’: just as
‘liberty’ changes sense in the term ‘civil liberty’, so ‘law’ changes sense in
‘law of nature’ and does not mean ’law’.
Martinich offers several responses, but here I focus only on his
appeal to speech act theory to distinguish between the “action-guiding
propositional part” and the “force-indicating part” of a law of nature (155).
He claims that Hobbes derives the propositional part from definitions via his
scientific method, but God’s command supplies the force-indicating part. This
diremption is Martinich’s way to explain how the laws of nature are both
rational theorems and divine commands. That explanation confers a substantial
hermeneutic advantage over the nonlaw view, which has to dismiss Hobbes’s
assertion that the laws of nature are laws as an “inconvenience” (Deigh 2016,
309).
Martinich does not here provide an account of which components of a
law of nature constitute the action-guiding or force-indicating parts. He does
point out that the commands can be stated in the indicative mood in a way that
allows them to play their inferential role in Hobbes’s science. The main
concern is that Martinich saddles Hobbes with a speech act theory, and the only
argument that Hobbes accepted such a theory seems to be that it would help
explain his double account of the laws of nature. That might be an acceptable
price to pay if we had no simpler account, but in fact we do. As I have shown
(Byron 2015, ch. 2), Hobbes can leverage the distinct normative statuses
of counsel and command to do the work that Martinich proposes to do with speech
act theory. The normative status of counsel or advice is instrumental,
consistent with Hobbes’s narrow view of reason. The “dictates of reason” have
the normative force of counsel, and depend for their application on our
desiring the end specified. Since that end is peace, a general condition of
surviving long enough to pursue felicity, we all have sufficient reason to
follow those dictates, even apart from their normative status as law.
Their status as law, however, depends not merely on their being
commanded, but also on a prior obligation of those commanded to do the
commander’s bidding (Hobbes 1651, 26.2/137). And Hobbes’s remarks about civil
law in chapter 26 apply to natural law too: some people fail to submit to God
and become what Hobbes calls “God’s enemies” (Hobbes 1651, 31.2/186). God’s
enemies refuse to submit to God, so they are under no obligation to obey God
(despite having prudential reason to obey the dictates of reason). Note that
this interpretation has the double advantage of neither imputing a speech act
theory to Hobbes, nor introducing a distinction between two kinds of
obligation. Instead, it relies on the different normative statuses of counsel
and command, a distinction that Hobbes does draw.
In chapter 10 Martinich explains why Hobbes’s account of God’s
natural sovereignty is possible, despite the explicit definition of ‘sovereign’
in terms of a sovereign-making covenant. There, Martinich contends that, “it is
plausible that a sovereign is a person who has the right to command, that is,
the right to have people obey simply because the person desires it”
(Martinich 2021, 207–8). This claim probably glosses this definition: “Command is where a man saith do not
this, without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it
(Hobbes 1651, 25.2/131),” where Hobbes understands ‘will’ as the last
deliberated desire. But anyone might have a right to command, which is neither
identical to nor entails a “right to have people obey.” What distinguishes the
sovereign from any other commander is that the sovereign’s commands have the
normative force of law, and they have that force because its subjects have
submitted and thereby promised to obey (Hobbes 1651, 26.2/137). So although
sovereigns do have the right to command and the right to have people obey,
these rights do not coincide in the way Martinich seems to suggest.
The situation with God is different in virtue of the fact that God
has dominion, or the right to rule, by virtue of irresistible power. Yet that
right does not entail a correlative obligation on us: Hobbes denies that God
literally reigns over all people: some are not subject to God’s natural
sovereignty, and he classifies them as God’s “enemies” (Hobbes 1651, 31.2/186).
The difference between being God’s natural subject and God’s enemy is that the
subjects have submitted, which is a voluntary act (Byron 2021). That voluntary
submission, with its promise to obey, is the act in virtue of which the
rational theorems of the laws of nature gain the status of law for God’s
natural subjects, and in virtue of which those laws become obligatory. So it is
equally incorrect to say of the divine sovereign that God has “the right to
have people obey simply because [God] desires it.”
The topic of sovereignty brings me to chapter 9, where Martinich
addresses an apparent inconsistency in Hobbes’s treatment of sovereignty by
acquisition. The issue arises because Hobbes “seems to say that the conquering
sovereign becomes a covenanting party in sovereignty by acquisition” (176).
Hobbes says that:
“Dominion [is] … acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words or by other sufficient signs of the will that so long as his life and liberty of his body is allowed to him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure” (Hobbes 1651, 20.10/104).
After pointing out that Hobbes should not have assimilated parental
authority or despotism as examples—much less paradigms—of sovereignty,
Martinich proposes a clever reading of this and related passages. The solution
is to treat the “conquering sovereign” as an artificial person representing the
subjects of the commonwealth: “the victorious subjects covenant with the
vanquished through the person of their sovereign, who represents them” (191).
In that way, he reinterprets the covenant between victor and vanquished as a
covenant between existing subjects and incoming subjects of a commonwealth.
This idea, though grounded in Hobbes’s idea of an artificial person, does not
capture the point Hobbes makes in chapter 20 and elsewhere, which is that the
vanquished are submitting to the victor whose sword is at their throats,
not to those back home whom he represents qua artificial person.
Martinich strays at the outset with his term ‘conquering sovereign’,
which read literally should be an oxymoron for Hobbes. If you conquer me, you
are not my sovereign; if you are my sovereign, you cannot conquer me (as I have
already submitted to you). Martinich uses this term throughout his chapter, and
I believe it leads him to see a problem where there is none. The vanquished
submit not to the artificial person of the sovereign (nor to those that person
represents), but to the victor, or the natural person who has vanquished them
on the battlefield. This act of submission constitutes them as new subjects of
the commonwealth, and requires a covenant neither between subjects and
non-subjects nor between anyone and sovereigns as such.
Hobbes makes this point when he argues that it is not the victory
but the consent of the vanquished that confers dominion on the victor (and thus
constitutes him or the sovereign he represents as the new sovereign of the
vanquished).
“It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered …, but because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy’s rendering himself … to spare him for this his yielding to discretion, which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit” (Hobbes 1651, 20.11/104).
So the way out of the conundrum concerning an apparent
sovereign-subject covenant is to recognize that Hobbes never says such a
covenant occurs. He describes a covenant between two natural persons, the
victor and the vanquished, even when the natural person of the victor happens
to coincide with the artificial person of a sovereign.
Martinich creates another difficulty where perhaps none exists with
his notion of “sovereignty by substitution.” He creates this tool as a way to
suggest that Hobbes’s two stated modes of commonwealth creation, institution
and acquisition, are not sufficient to account for all possible or actual
commonwealths. Martinich envisions a possible world in which William of Orange
conquers England, but directs the vanquished to submit to Mary Hyde instead of
himself. Such a scenario seems to be neither commonwealth by institution—the
English were conquered—nor by acquisition—the victor is William but the
sovereign is Mary. To account for this kind of case, Martinich coins
‘sovereignty by substitution’ (185).
But Hobbes already has an account of such cases, not as commonwealth
creation but as succession. When the English submit to the victor, they submit
to William. For however short a time, he is their sovereign. When William
directs the English to take Mary as their sovereign, this is succession, the
right of which Hobbes ascribes to the sovereign in chapter 19. “[I]t is
manifest that by the institution of monarchy the disposing of the successor is
always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor … [and] it
is determined by his express words and testament, or by other tacit signs
sufficient” (Hobbes 1651, 19.18–19/100). So it is not necessary to beg the
question against Martinich by assuming that only two modes of commonwealth
creation are possible, only to distinguish two moments that Martinich seems to
collapse, namely commonwealth creation (by acquisition) and succession. So
though I agree that Hobbes might have recognized more than two modes of
commonwealth creation, I do not think that this William-to-Mary example
illustrates one.
Michael Byron (Kent State University)
References
Byron, Michael. 2015. Submission and Subjection in Leviathan:
Good Subjects in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Byron, Michael. 2021. “Hobbes on Submission to God.” In A
Companion to Hobbes, ed. Marcus P. Adams, 287–302. Blackwell Companions to
Philosophy. Wiley Blackwell.
Deigh, John. 2016. “Political Obligation.” In The Oxford Handbook
of Hobbes, edited by A. P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. London.